Command and Control

Mother Jones has an excerpt from Eric Schlosser's new book on the various accidents and near misses of our nuclear program over the years, along with an interview.  I've highlighted a few of them, where the U.S. accidentally dropped nuclear bombs or crashed planes carrying the bombs, along with tests and bad ideas the government had about how to beneficially use nuclear bombs, but this story is a new one to me:

Launch Complex 374-7 was involved in two incidents. The first took place on morning of 27 January 1978, at approximately 0915, when the oncoming missile combat crew approaching the launch complex noticed oxidizer vapors rising from the missile complex. They drove to Damascus and contacted the command post, which in turn notified the Missile Potential Hazard Team (MPHT) members. By 0945 the MPHT directed the missile combat crew commander at the complex to turn off the circuit breakers to the heaters on the oxidizer transport trailers. The heaters were used to keep the oxidizer between 42 and 60 F in preparation for flowing into the holding trailer. Meanwhile, a helicopter from the 37th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron was sent to provide aerial surveillance of the situation. At 1030 the helicopter crew confirmed the presence of oxidizer vapors rising from the trailer and crossing State Highway 65 in a cloud approximately 3,000 feet long, 300 feet wide and 100 feet in height. The MPHT immediately directed the Van Buren County Sheriff's Department to block Highway 65 and requested evacuation of civilians in the path of the oxidizer cloud, including an elementary school 1.5 miles north of the complex. At 1042 a second helicopter with propellant transfer personnel in rocket fuel handlers clothing outfits was dispatched. Upon arrival at the complex, the team reported that the oxidizer trailer tank was at 101 F and leaking around the manhole cover, the safety rupture discs had not yet burst. They sprayed water on the tank to cool it off and tightened the manhole cover bolts, decreasing the amount of vapor considerably. By 1405 Highway 65 was reopened to traffic. By 2120 the oxidizer had been transferred to the holding trailer and the hazard situation was terminated. Four civilians displayed some symptoms of contact with the vapors and were transported to the Little Rock AFB hospital for evaluation. Two were released the same day and two were held overnight for observation, subsequently released, readmitted and released on 4 February 1978.
The second incident, and the one that makes this launch complex exceptionally significant within the context of the entire Titan II program, took place at 1835 hours 20 September 1980, during a routine Stage II oxidizer tank repressurization procedure. An 8.75 pound socket wrench socket was inadvertently dropped from a work platform in the launch duct on Level 2. After a drop of approximately 66 feet, the socket hit the missile thrust mount and bounced in towards the missile, puncturing the Stage I propellant tank, filled with Aerozine 50, a 1:1 mix of unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine and hydrazine. A Missile Potential Hazard Team was formed and the surrounding civilian population evacuated as a precautionary measure. A propellant transfer system team was formed to attempt to penetrate into the launch control center and into the launch duct area.
At 0300 hours on 21 September 1980, the accumulated fuel vapors were ignited, causing an explosion that destroyed the missile silo. The silo closure door, which weighed 740 tons, was thrown several hundred feet upwards and landed 625 feet to the northeast of the silo. The W-53 warhead was found damaged but basically intact without a detectable leakage of radioactive material.
Amazingly enough, only one person was fatally injured: Senior Airman David Livingston, one member of a two- man propellant transfer team investigating the status of the silo just prior to the explosion.
A 40-member Eighth Air Force Mishap Investigation Board and a separate Missile Accident Investigation Board evaluated the accident and concluded that the near-disaster was caused by human error and gave high marks to the silo, which largely contained the massive explosion, and the warhead, which was not blown up by its conventional explosive components. In fact, a partial glass of Coca Cola abandoned in the control center did not spill in the massive explosion, a testament to the facility’s shock- absorbent design.

 The book excerpt gives a lot of fascinating information about the Titan II, its propulsion system, the silos and procedures for working with the missiles.  For example:

The missile was designed to launch within a minute and hit a target as far as 6,000 miles away. In order to do that, the Titan II relied upon a pair of liquid propellants—a rocket fuel and an oxidizer—that were "hypergolic." The moment they came into contact with each other, they'd instantly and forcefully ignite. The missile had two stages, and inside both of them, an oxidizer tank rested on top of a fuel tank, with pipes leading down to an engine. Stage 1, which extended about 70 feet upward from the bottom of the missile, contained about 85,000 pounds of fuel and 163,000 pounds of oxidizer.
Stage 2, the upper section where the warhead sat, was smaller and held about one fourth of those amounts. If the missile were launched, fuel and oxidizer would flow through the stage 1 pipes, mix inside the combustion chambers of the engine, catch on fire, emit hot gases, and send almost half a million pounds of thrust through the supersonic convergent-divergent nozzles beneath it. Within a few minutes, the Titan II would be 50 miles off the ground.
The two propellants were extremely efficient—and extremely dangerous. The fuel, Aerozine-50, could spontaneously ignite when it came into contact with everyday things like wool, rags, or rust. As a liquid, Aerozine-50 was clear and colorless. As a vapor, it reacted with the water and the oxygen in the air and became a whitish cloud with a fishy smell. This fuel vapor could be explosive in proportions as low as 2 percent. Inhaling it could cause breathing difficulties, a reduced heart rate, vomiting, convulsions, tremors, and death. The fuel was also highly carcinogenic and easily absorbed through the skin. 
The missile's oxidizer, nitrogen tetroxide, was even more hazardous. Under federal law, it was classified as a "Poison A," the most deadly category of man-made chemicals. In its liquid form, the oxidizer was a translucent, yellowy brown. Although not as flammable as the fuel, it could spontaneously ignite if it touched leather, paper, cloth, or wood. And its boiling point was only 70 degrees Fahrenheit. At temperatures any higher, the liquid oxidizer boiled into a reddish brown vapor that smelled like ammonia. Contact with water turned the vapor into a corrosive acid that could react with the moisture in a person's eyes or skin and cause severe burns. When inhaled, the oxidizer could destroy tissue in the upper respiratory system and the lungs. The damage might not be felt immediately. Six to twelve hours after being inhaled, the stuff could suddenly cause headaches, dizziness, difficulty breathing, pneumonia, and pulmonary edema leading to death.

Sounds like fun to work around.  Apparently, there were hundreds of more accidents and near misses, and it is a real tribute to the scientists and engineers, along with Lady Luck, that we didn't have a massive nuclear accident that killed thousands of people during the Cold War.  And if we had this many fuckups and accidents, I can only imagine how many crazy things happened in the Soviet Union.  Maybe that proves there is a God.